It has been over a year since the COVID-19 pandemic first struck the globe; harrowing landscapes of mass graves, the blaring of ambulances, and the sound of patients gasping for air within COVID-19 wards have long since disappeared-- or as we like to believe. Although numerous countries worldwide have begun to lift travel restrictions, mask mandates, and other implemented health protocols in the past year, such is not the case for a handful of countries in the midst of dealing with another COVID-19 health crisis within their borders.
After over a year of a global pandemic, ideally, we hope that everything has somewhat returned to normal, though that is not the case here. As it is generally known, Indonesia is currently undergoing a massive escalating crisis with COVID-19 infection rates and death tolls spiking by the day, whereas other countries are beginning to transition into a life without COVID-19. This raises the question, where did Indonesia go wrong in responding to the pandemic? In this article, multiple factors will be discussed regarding this matter, all from the start, to the current response the Indonesian government and public have exhibited amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.
To fully understand the full response of the Indonesian government towards the COVID-19 pandemic, the initial response that was undertaken by the government from the early stages of COVID-19 (January-March 2020) should be taken into account. Prior to the global health pandemic declaration made by the World Health Organization (WHO) back in 2020, Indonesia officially reported that it had 0 cases of COVID-19 within its borders. Moreover, Indonesia did not impose any sort of travel restriction from any neighboring countries-- even China, the epicentre at the time-- despite infections already spreading to its neighboring states. It only did so later on during January 27, 2020, where the government also repatriated 238 of its citizens who were residing in Wuhan. Ever since then, the Indonesian government has taken measures to alleviate any potential cases, namely increasing the number of COVID-19 referral hospitals (up to more than 200 in mid-March 2020), and creating a website to post all things related to COVID-19 within the country (Djalante, 2020).
Djalante (2020) further noted the issue of data transparency and complacency during the early stages of the pandemic. For instance, on March 11, 2020, there was an uproar from the public asking the government to be more transparent in providing data regarding COVID-19 due to a belief that the full extent of the problem is being underreported. In early April of 2020, a spokesperson from the National Disaster Mitigation Agency (BNPB) stated that the ministry of health’s data on case numbers did not match those of the reports made by provincial heads countrywide, indicating that their data is incomplete. Moreover, despite sentiments made by the president on staying home and working from home, there were no other regulations imposed during the time to enforce the statement (Human Rights Watch, 2020)
The following table (Fig 1.1) from Djalante (2021) could be observed to further understand the timeline of the Indonesian government’s early COVID-19 pandemic response from January-March 2020:
Fig 1.1
The Indonesian government’s first lockdown effort was undertaken in the capital city, Jakarta, on April 9, 2020, under Governor Regulation No. 3030 of 2020 under the name of ‘PSBB’. This was followed by another governor decree on April 16, which was meant to provide/relay aid for those struggling amidst the lockdown; during this time, cases in Indonesia were still exponentially growing. Knowing this, the government issued a warning for all citizens not to go outside for Eid-al Fitr festivities, as the lockdown coincided with one of the biggest year-round religious festivities in Indonesia (Hanggara, 2020). Ironically, although such warnings were spread, cases have only continued to multiply at an ever-growing rate since then.
As of July 22, 2021, there was an increase of 49,509 cases in Indonesia, tallying up the total case numbers to about 3 million cases countrywide (German-Indonesian Chamber of Industry and Commerce, 2021). There are two main reasons which are speculated to be the cause of a sharp rise in cases of COVID-19 in Indonesia in 2021: the Delta variant and a spike in travel during Eid-al Fitr festivities. As of the moment, the Delta variant is the most contagious mutation of the COVID-19 virus-- about 50% faster in spreading than the Alpha variant, which was already 50% more contagious than the original strain (Katella, 2021). The Delta variant’s presence within Indonesian borders is suspected to have been imported from India, as the health minister stated that imported goods from India may have brought the disease to the ports of Indonesia. Though, experts believe that the travels done during the Eid-al Fitr festivities were the main catalyst for this spike in cases as despite the restrictions on travel placed on airports and ferry terminals, up to 6 million people still managed to travel between some of the most densely populated areas of the country (Al Jazeera, 2021).
Another key issue at hand is also how the government has continued to prioritise the economy over the ongoing health crisis, about to reach its peak. Many health experts have criticized such a move from the government, as from the COVID-19 stimulus package which reached a whopping amount of 695 trillion dollars, only 87 trillion was allocated to healthcare, with more than 200 trillion allocated to business related stimuli/incentives (Eloksari, 2020). One of the policies enacted by the government to help curb COVID-19 is cutting the state budget to be reallocated to relief efforts-- instead of imposing lockdowns. Such efforts have ranged from wavering electricity bills, and providing stimulus checks to those earning under a certain amount of income monthly for basic necessities. Moreover, the president has continuously argued how lockdowns may be economically and socially unfeasible, hence the promise of aid packages through the aforementioned relief efforts. However, many Indonesians have complained as to how the government has failed to deliver said aid (Wicaksono, 2020).
Additionally, aside from managing the healthcare system of the country, the government also faces challenges of handling an ‘infodemic’ of misinformation on vaccines and anti-vaxx sentiments; based on a survey conducted in 2020 by the Ministry of Communications and Information, 64 to 79 percent of Indonesians could not recognize misinformation online (UNICEF, 2021). It is common sense that a crucial step to curbing an ongoing pandemic is to get a majority of the population vaccinated, though anti-vaxx sentiments make such an initiative difficult. According to data from the Indonesian Anti-Slander Society (MAFINDO), ‘Tiktok’-- a popular video social media platform-- is one of the main ways such sentiments get spread. They further elaborated that the people spreading such misinformation can be separated into three groups: the religious groups, the anti-west bias group, and the anti-Chinese group. Each group has their own way of spreading misinformation/hoaxes; most notably though, those within the religious group went as far as to saying that vaccines were part of a conspiracy to insert microchips into the people, and saying that the government is trying to steal the citizen’s money. Concerningly, such videos gained massive engagement, with hundreds of thousands of likes, shares and comments, predominantly agreeing with the statements made (Sastramidjaja and Rosli, 2021).
Taking all these factors into account, it can be concluded that many things have led to the rising crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic that Indonesia is currently experiencing. From a relatively weak response in the beginning of the pandemic, the non-compliance of citizens, to the spread of misinformation, all of these combined may have just been the perfect ingredients to brew a chaotic tempest of rapidly rising COVID-19 infections in Indonesia. The future is unclear-- and probably bleak too-- as there is no sign of the situation deescalating any time soon. Perhaps we need a deus ex machina, or maybe if both the government further tightens the enforcement of pandemic restrictions, and the citizens comply with every measure set in place, we might just see the light at the end of the tunnel in a few months to come.
SOURCES CITED:
Djalante, R. (2020). Sci-Hub | Review and analysis of current responses to COVID-19 in Indonesia: Period of January to March 2020. Progress in Disaster Science, 100091 | 10.1016/j.pdisas.2020.100091. [online] Sci-hub.se. Available at: https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2020.100091 [Accessed 24 Jul. 2021].
Human Rights Watch (2020). Indonesia: Little Transparency in COVID-19 Outbreak. [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/09/indonesia-little-transparency-covid-19-outbreak [Accessed 24 Jul. 2021].
Hanggara, A. (2020). Jakarta’s COVID-19 Response Team. [online] Jakarta’s COVID-19 Response Team. Available at: https://corona.jakarta.go.id/en/artikel/linimasa-kebijakan-penanganan-pandemi-covid-19-di-jakarta [Accessed 24 Jul. 2021].
Katella, K. (2021). 5 Things To Know About the Delta Variant. [online] Yale Medicine. Available at: https://www.yalemedicine.org/news/5-things-to-know-delta-variant-covid [Accessed 24 Jul. 2021].
Al Jazeera (2021). “It will get very bad”: Experts warn on Indonesia COVID surge. [online] Aljazeera.com. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/18/indonesia-covid [Accessed 24 Jul. 2021].
Eloksari, E. (2020). Govt should prioritise health response over economic recovery: Task Force. [online]. Available at: https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/09/11/govt-should-prioritize-health-response-over-economic-recovery-task-force.html [Accessed 25 Jul. 2021]
Wicaksono, R. (2020). Examining the Policies and Priorities of the Indonesian Government in Response to COVID-19. [online] Lipi.go.id. Available at: http://www.politik.lipi.go.id/kolom/kolom-2/politik-nasional/1410-examining-the-policies-and-priorities-of-the-indonesian-government-in-response-to-covid-19 [Accessed 24 Jul. 2021].
German-Indonesian Chamber of Industry and Commerce (2021). COVID-19 developments in Indonesia. [online] AHK Indonesien. Available at: https://indonesien.ahk.de/en/infocenter/news/news-details/covid-19-developments-in-indonesia [Accessed 25 Jul. 2021].
UNICEF (2021). Countering an “infodemic” amid a pandemic. [online] Unicef.org. Available at: https://www.unicef.org/indonesia/coronavirus/stories/countering-infodemic-amid-pandemic [Accessed 25 Jul. 2021].
Sastramidjaja, Y. and Rosli, A. (2021). Tracking the Swelling COVID-19 Vaccine Chatter on TikTok in Indonesia. [online] . Available at: https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ISEAS_Perspective_2021_82.pdf [Accessed 25 Jul. 2021].
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